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Abstract—Cooperative communication can improve commu-
nication quality in wireless communication networks through
strategic relay selection. However, wireless cooperative communi-
cation networks are vulnerable to the attacks initiated on relays.
Although applying authentication protocols can secure cooperative
communication when the selected relay is malicious, better system
throughput could be obtained without executing authentication
protocol when the selected relay is free from attacker’s attack. In
this paper, a game theoretic approach is proposed to quantitatively
analyze the attacking strategies of the attacker who chooses one
relay to attack so as to make rational decision on relay selection
and extent of applying authentication protocols, which reaches
the trade-off between system security requirement and quality of
service (QoS) in wireless cooperative communication networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, there are tremendous progresses in wireless com-
munications and networks [1]–[6] Cooperative communication
provides an effective way to improve communication quality of
wireless communication networks through the cooperation of
users [7]–[9]. Wireless cooperative communication networks
differ from traditional wireless communication networks, in
which the users communicate individually with the associ-
ated base stations. The fundamental idea behind cooperative
communication is that single-antenna mobiles in a multi-user
scenario can share their antennas in a manner that creates a
virtual MIMO system. It is well-known that the mobile wire-
less channel suffers from fading; in another word, the signal
attenuation can vary significantly over the course of a given
transmission. Transmitting independent copies of the signal
generates diversity and can effectively combat the deleterious
effects of fading [8], [10].
While cooperative communication provides dramatic com-
munication quality improvement for wireless communication
networks, security issues arise in wireless ad hoc networks
[11]–[15], which are caused by the decentralized characteris-
tics, lack of centralized control and self-organization. Authen-
tication is a process that involves in a communication process
between an authenticator and supplicant to identify the identity
of supplicant. Therefore, authentication is important, with the
consequent need to know exactly who we are talking to and
make sure that the message received from a node is exact the
message that had been sent by that node. Authentication sup-
ports privacy, confidentiality, and access control by verifying
and validating the received message.
To combat the attack on relays, several lightweight au-
thentication protocols, which are based on computationally
efficient hash chain, can be applied in cooperative wireless
communication networks. Timed efficient stream loss-tolerant
authentication (TESLA) is a broadcast authentication protocol
based on loose time synchronization [16]. However, hop-
by-hop authentication is not supported by TESLA and the
computational overhead of TESLA is also high due to the
existence of network latencies and redundant hash elements.
The lightweight hop-by-hop authentication protocol (LHAP) is
based on the principles of TESLA to carry out both packet
authentication and hop-by-hop authentication, wherein inter-
mediate users authenticate all the packets received prior to
forwarding them [17]. However, LHAP also suffers from long
latency and poor throughput, and is not designed to prevent
inside attacks. Hop-by-hop efficient authentication protocol
(HEAP) authenticates packets at every hop by using modified
hash message authentication code based algorithm along with
two keys and dropping any packet that originates from outsiders
[18]. However, HEAP suffers from inside attack and could not
provide end-to-end authentication. Adaptive and lightweight
protocol for hop-by-hop authentication (ALPHA), which makes
use of hash chains and Merkle tress, provides both end-to-
end and hop-by-hop authentication and integrity protection, and
it overcomes the shortcomings of above mentioned protocols.
Taking the advantage of ALPHA along with physical layer
parameters, an optimized and security enabled relay selection
approach is proposed in [19].
Though ALPHA is computationally efficient, better system
throughput could be obtained without applying any authentica-
tion protocol when cooperative relays are selected. Therefore,
a quantitative decision approach is needed for strategic relay
selection and the extent of applying authentication protocols.
Game theory is a discipline used to model situations in which
decision makers have to make specific actions that have con-
flicting interest.
In this paper, we propose a static game theoretical approach
for security and QoS co-design in cooperative wireless ad hoc
networks. Based on the proposed game theoretic approach, a
quantitative decision is made on relay selection and the extent
of applying authentication protocols. Simulation results are
presented to show the effectiveness of the proposed scheme.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In
section II, the system model is described. Section III scratches
the proposed static game theoretical approach for security and
QoS co-design and presents the analytical results. Simulation
results and discussion are presented in Section IV. Finally,
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Fig. 1: A cooperative communication network.
conclusions are drawn in Section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Figure 1 illustrates a typical cooperative communication
network. A cooperative communication process consists of two
time slots. In the first time slot, the source broadcasts the
information which could be heard both by the destination and
relays that locate in its coverage. In the second time slot, if
the received signal could be decoded by the selected relay
successfully, and then it is forwarded to the destination; finally
the destination combines the received signal from both the
source and the selected relay to recover originally transmitted
information. In this paper, we focuses on two-hop cooperative
wireless communication networks, as illustrated in Figure 1,
consisting of source, destination, multiple intermediate relays
and a fading channel that satisfies Rayleigh distribution.
In this paper, we represent the set of relays as R. The attack
on relays initiated by an attacker is independent with each
other. The interactions between the attacker and the source are
modeled as a non-cooperative game, since both the tendencies
of the attacker and the source are to maximize their total
utility through the strategic selection of attacking target and
relay. The attacker selects the attack probability distribution
P = {p1, p2, . . . , pK} over relay nodes set R, where pi is
the probability of initiating attack on relay Ri, and K is the
number of candidate relays in the radio coverage of the source.
For the source, it selects relay with a probability distribution
Q = {q1, q2, . . . , qK} on R, where qi is the probability of
selecting relay Ri as the relay.
We assume that each relay processes a combination of
information asset, which is indicator of instantaneous channel
condition, and security asset, which is indicator of security
importance of this relay in the network. The asset combination
is denoted as αIIi+αSSi. αI and αS represent the weights of
information asset and security asset in the asset combination.
The information asset is evaluated by the mutual information
between the source and the destination through the selected
relay Ri; and the security asset is evaluated in the risk analysis
by using formal analysis before system deployment. We also
assume that all relays are potential victims of the attack initiated
TABLE I: Utility matrix of attacker and source on relay Ri
Select Not select
Attack (1 − 2a − Ca)Ai,
−(1 − 2a + Cm)Ai
(1 − Ca)Ai,−Ai
Not attack 0,−(bCf + Cm)Ai 0, 0
by the attacker. On each relay, the attacker takes two actions,
choose to attack, denoted as Attack or does not choose to
attack, denoted as Not attack. This assumption applies to
model the networks in which all relays have been suffering
from constant attack initiated by the attacker. In static game
theoretic approach, if relay Ri is selected by the attacker as
the attacking target and selected by the source as the relay as
well, then the attacker will obtain utility αIIi + αSSi, while
the source will lose the same amount of utility. Otherwise,
the utility for the attacker and the source are −(αIIi + αSSi)
and αIIi + αSSi, respectively. Note that other types of utility
formulations are also possible. In those cases, analysis in this
paper can be extended by modifying the utility functions of
the attacker and the source. Substitute αIIi + αSSi by Ai,
Table 1 illustrates the utility matrix of the attacker and the
source on relay Ri in the strategic form. In the matrix, a
denotes the attacking detection rate of the source, b denotes
the false alarm rate, and 0 ≤ a, b ≤ 1. The cost of attacking
for attacker and attack monitoring for source, Ca and Cm, are
taken into consideration in our model and assumed proportional
to the value set of relay Ri, denoted by Ca(αIIi + αSSi) and
Cm(αIIi+αSSi). Cf (αIIi+αSSi) denotes the loss of source
caused by false alarm.
We denote the total utility of the attacker and the source as
UA(P,Q) and US(P,Q):
UA(P,Q) =
∑
i∈R
piAi(1− 2aqi − Ca) (1)
US(P,Q) =
∑
i∈R
qiAi[pi(2a+ bCf )− (bCf + Cm)]− piAi
(2)
III. STRATEGIC SELECTION AND SYSTEM PERFORMANCE
ANALYSIS
A. Nash Equilibrium of the Proposed Static Game Theoretic
Approach
The most significant solution concept for the proposed static
game theoretic for security and QoS co-design in cooperative
wireless ad hoc networks is Nash equilibrium, by which no
player has incentive to deviate from its current optimal strategy
[20]. Nash equilibrium could be taken as the optimal agreement
between the attacker and the source. A strategy profile (P ∗, Q∗)
is said to be a Nash Equilibrium of our game if both attacker
and source could not improve their overall utility UA and US by
deviating their contemporary optimal strategies. In cooperative
wireless ad hoc networks, both the attacker and the source
have limited system resource, such as limited battery life or
limited computational capacity; thus it is natural for the attacker
to focus on some targets that are more beneficial compared
3by initiating attack on the other targets. Samiliar to [21], we
sort the relays based on their combination of information and
security asset and divide the whole set of relays into three
subsets, sensible targets set, quasi-sensible and non-sensible
targets set by basing on weight of each relay’s asset over the
overall assets composed by all relay nodes’. The more the
combined asset the relay node owns, the higher the possibility
such relay node becomes the victim of attacking.
Definition 1. The sensible target set RS , the quasi-sensible
target set RQ and non-sensible target set RN are defined such
that,

αIIi + αSSi >
|RS|(1−Ca)−2a
(1−Ca)
∑
j∈Rs
1
αIIj+αSSj
, ∀i ∈ RS
αIIi + αSSi =
|RS|(1−Ca)−2a
(1−Ca)
∑
j∈Rs
1
αIIj+αSSj
, ∀i ∈ RQ
αIIi + αSSi <
|RS|(1−Ca)−2a
(1−Ca)
∑
j∈Rs
1
αIIj+αSSj
, ∀i ∈ RN
(3)
where |RS | is the cardinality of RS .
The cardinality of RS could be calculated as follows:
1. if αIIK + αSSK > K(1−Ca)−2a
(1−Ca)
∑|R|
j=1
1
αIIj+αSSj
, then |RS | =
K and |RQ| = 0.
2. if αIIK + αSSK ≤ K(1−Ca)−2a
(1−Ca)
∑|R|
j=1
1
αIIj+αSSj
, |RS | is
determined by the following formulas:


αII|RS | + αSS|RS| >
|RS|(1−Ca)−2a
(1−Ca)
∑|RS|
j=1
1
αIIj+αSSj
αII|RS |+1 + αSS|RS|+1 ≤
|RS |(1−Ca)−2a
(1−Ca)
∑|RS|
j=1
1
αIIj+αSSj
(4)
As mentioned above, there are two players in the proposed
static game theoretic approach, and thus there exists at least one
Nash equilibrium [21]. Follows are components of the Nash
equilibrium (P ∗, Q∗) of the proposed static game theoretic
approach:
p∗i


= 1
Ai
∑|R|
j=1
1
Aj
− ( |RS|
Ai
∑|R|
j=1
1
Aj
) ·
bCf+Cm
2a+bCf
, i ∈ RS
∈ [0, 1
Ai
∑|R|
j=1
1
Aj
− ( |RS |
Ai
∑|R|
j=1
1
Aj
) ·
bCf+Cm
2a+bCf
], i ∈ RQ
= 0, i ∈ RN
(5)
q∗i =


1
2a (1− Ca −
|RS|(1−Ca)−2a
Ai
∑|R|
j=1
1
Aj
), i ∈ RS
0. otherwise
(6)
Up to now, we have obtained the attacker’s attacking target
selection strategies and the source’s relay selection strategies
on all candidate relays. In the next section, the analysis on
system performance is presented.
B. System Performance Analysis
Denote the utility brought by a successful attack on targeted
relay Ri as uA(pi, qi). We assume that the attacker prefers
selecting relay Ri with the attacking probability p∗i that max-
imizes uA(pi, qi) as its attacking target. However, when a
decision on relay selection is made, the source could not make
sure which relay is selected as the attacking target except for
a probability of being attacked. Therefore, the source would
not necessarily authenticate all packets due to the fact that
there exists the possibility that these packets forwarded by the
selected relay which is not selected by the attacker as attacking
target. Compared with the approach proposed in [19], which au-
thenticates all transmitted packets without considering the pos-
sibility that the selected relay is cooperative, the proposed game
theoretic approach provides a quantitative approach to calculate
the authentication probability based on the attacker’s attacking
probabilities on relays and system security requirement. The
proposed scheme can avoid the unnecessary consumption of
system resources, which leads to better system performance
in the form of throughput. Denote the probability of message
authentication as pa. To satisfy system security requirement ps
which defines that for every 100 packets sent through selected
relay there are at most 100 ∗ ps packets compromised by the
attacker, we have 0 ≤ (1− pa) · p∗i ≤ ps by selecting relay Ri
as the relay with probability p∗i being attacked by the attacker.
1) Outage Probability and Capacity: Suppose the data
transmission rate of the cooperative wireless communication
between the source and the destination is r. Outage probability
P Iiout is defined as the probability that the mutual information
Ii between the source and the destination through relay Ri is
lower than the data transmission rate r, i.e., P Iiout = P{Ii < r},
which characterizes the probability of transmission data loss. In
the case of the proposed game theoretic approach, the outage
probability is defined as below:
P Iiout = P{max{IDC ,min{ISRi , IMRC}} < r}. (7)
IDC is the mutual information of direct communication be-
tween the source and the destination, which is given by
IDC = log2(1 + |hSD|
2SNR). (8)
ISRi is the mutual information between the source and the
selected relay Ri, which is given by
ISRi =
1
2
log2(1 + |hSRi |
2SNR). (9)
IMRC is the mutual information sum of source-destination and
relay Ri-destination [22], which is
IMRC =
1
2
log2(1 + (|hSD|
2 + |hRiD|
2)SNR), (10)
where |hSD| is the channel between the source and the desti-
nation and |hRiD| is the channel between the selected relay Ri
and the destination.
P Iiout = 1− v +
ω(d
α
SRi
+dαRiD)(v(1−d
α
RiD
) − 1)
1− dαRiD
, (11)
where ω equals to exp(2 ln v − (ln v)2γ) and v equals to
exp(− 2
r−1
γ
). dSRi denotes the distance between the source
and selected relay Ri, dRiD denotes the distance between
selected relay Ri and the destination, and γ denotes the average
transmitted SNR between any relays.
42) Bit Error Rate: Bit Error Rate (BER) is the percentage
of bits that have errors relative to the total number of bits sent
in a transmission. The end-to-end BER is given by
P Iie = P
SRi
out · P
DC
e + (1 − P
SRi
out ) · P
div,i
e , (12)
where PSRiout is the outage probability of the link from the
source to the selected relay Ri, which is given as below:
PSRiout = 1− exp(−(
22r − 1
γSRi
)), (13)
where γSRi denotes the SNR between the source and the
selected relay Ri. PDCe is the probability of error in direct com-
munication from the source to the destination over Rayleigh
channel, which is given by
PDCe =
1
2
(1−
√
γSD
1 + γSD
), (14)
where γSD denotes the SNR between the source and the desti-
nation. P div,ie is the probability that an error occurs in combined
transmission from the source to the destination through the
selected relay Ri. This occurs after the selected relay Ri
has successfully decoded received signal and forwarded the
signal to the destination. The error probability for combined
signal received from the selected relay Ri and the source of
two Binary Phase Shift Keying (BPSK) over Rayleigh fading
channels is given as follows:
P div,ie =
1
2
[1 +
1
γRiD − γSD
(
γSD√
1 + 1
γ
SD
−
γRiD√
1 + 1
γRiD
)],
(15)
where γRiD denotes the SNR between the selected relay Ri
and the destination.
3) System Throughput: We derive the throughput with
ALPHA-M protocol [23], which is defined as the payload
divided by the total time used for processing and transmit-
ting the payload. Furthermore, we formulate the throughput
equations for both Selective Repeat ARQ and Go-Back-N
ARQ retransmission schemes by taking the error rate into
consideration.
The payload for packets with authentication is given as
follow:
Spaylaod = n · pa · (Spacket − Sh(⌈log2(n)⌉+ 1)), (16)
where Spayload is the amount of payload that can be transmitted
with a single pre-signature, n is the number of data blocks at
the bottom of Merkle tree, Spacket is the size of packet, and
Sh is the hash output.
The payload for packets without authentication is
S
′
payload = n · (1 − pa) · (Spacket − Sh). (17)
In our case, the total time spent on payload processing
and transmitting consists of two parts: T1, the time for the
initial pre-signature process between the source and the desti-
nation; and T2, the time for the actual authenticated and non-
authenticated message transmission and delivery [19]. Then,
the general throughput T could be defined as:
T =
Spayload + S
′
payload
T1 + T2
. (18)
To incorporate the error control schemes into our through-
put equation, we expand the general throughput equation by
including the error rate. Define the packet error rate Pc as the
probability that the received packet with the length of Spacket
bits contains no error as Pc = (1 − P Iie )Spacket . Let TSR
denote the modified throughput with SR ARQ, which is given
as below,
TSR =
(Spayload + S
′
payload) · Pc
T1 + T2
. (19)
Concerning the GBN ARQ, the throughput equation is further
modified to allow the retransmission of an error frame along
with all frames that have been transmitted until the time a
negative acknowledgment is received from the destination. The
modified throughput with GBN ARQ, denoted by TGBN , is
given as,
TGBN =
(Spayload + S
′
payload) · Pc
T1 + T2[Pc + (1− Pc)Ws]
, (20)
where Ws is the window size which is calculated by dividing
the product of the data rate of the transmission channel and the
reaction time by the packet size.
4) Optimizing Number of Message: Besides strategically
selecting relay, the source also needs to determine the optimal
number of messages once its relay is selected. For various
packet sizes Spacket and authentication probability pa, the
optimal value of the number of messages n that results in the
maximum throughput is denoted as n∗. The optimal number of
messages for selected relay Ri is driven from
n∗ = argmax
n
T(i, Spacket, n, pa), (21)
where n ∈ {1, 2, . . .} for the selected relay Ri.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
A. Simulation Scenarios
In this section, we perform computer simulations to study
two typical networks to validate our analytical results in
attacking target selection and relay selection.
First of all, we consider a network with emphasis on system
security, e.g., a military network, where there is tight security
requirement. In this network, the security asset weights heavier
than the information asset, and the combined asset is much
higher than the attack monitoring cost, i.e., αI < αS and
Ca, Cm, Cf ≪ 1. We set Ca = Cm = 0.01 and Cf = 0.01.
Terminals in military network usually own high-performance
attack monitoring equipments and powerful processing capa-
bility, thus we set a = 0.9 and b = 0.05.
Secondly, a network with loose emphasis on system security
is considered, e.g., a commercial network. In this network, the
information asset weights heavier than the security asset, and
5TABLE II: Nash equilibrium and players’ utility in the military
network.
Nash equilibrium
p∗
1
= 0.23256,q∗
1
= 0.4
p∗
2
= 0.30814,q∗
2
= 0.35
p∗
3
= 0.4593,q∗
3
= 0.25
p∗
4
= 0,q∗
4
= 0
Players’ Utility
uA(p
∗
1
, q∗
1
) = 0.062792, uD(p
∗
1
, q∗
1
) = −0.069271
uA(p
∗
2
, q∗
2
) = 0.083198, uD(p
∗
2
, q∗
2
) = −0.088225
uA(p
∗
3
, q∗
1
) = 0.12401, uD(p
∗
1
, q∗
1
) = −0.12759
uA(p
∗
4
, q∗
4
) = 0, uD(p
∗
4
, q∗
4
) = 0
TABLE III: Nash equilibrium and players’ utility in the com-
mercial network.
Nash equilibrium
p∗
1
= 0.26984,q∗
1
= 0.46154
p∗
2
= 0.31746,q∗
2
= 0.36583
p∗
3
= 0.4127,q∗
3
= 0.17308
p∗
4
= 0,q∗
4
= 0
Players’ Utility
uA(p
∗
1
, q∗
1
) = 0.093407, uD(p
∗
1
, q∗
1
) = −0.18676
uA(p
∗
2
, q∗
2
) = 0.10989, uD(p
∗
2
, q∗
2
) = −0.17233
uA(p
∗
3
, q∗
3
) = 0.14286, uD(p
∗
3
, q∗
3
) = −0.1752
uA(p
∗
4
, q∗
4
) = 0, uD(p
∗
4
, q∗
4
) = 0
the related attacking and attack monitoring cost is high, i.e.,
αI > αS ; and we set Ca = Cm = 0.1 and Cf = 0.3. The
terminals in the commercial network are not as efficient as
those in the military network, thus we set a = 0.6 and b = 0.2.
In both networks, there are four relays with normalized infor-
mation and security assets: Ai = (5− i) ·0.25, i = {1, 2, 3, 4}.
Table II and Table III show the NE(P ∗, Q∗) of the proposed
static game theoretic approach. As shown in Table II and Table
III, both the attacker and the source focus only on the relays
in the sensible target set, which brings them more utility.
The attacker would choose the relay that brings maximum
attacking utility as its attacking target. According to the ob-
tained Nash equilibrium, the attacker in the military network
is prone to select Relay 3 as its attacking target. However, in
real networks, the attacking target is selected randomly by the
attacker. To simulate the randomness of attacker’s selection on
the attacking target, we generate a random numbers r′ that
satisfies 0-1 uniform distribution and set following attacking
target selection standard, e.g., if (i− 1) ∗ 0.25 ≤ r′ < i ∗ 0.25,
i = {1, 2, 3, 4}, relay Ri is selected as the attacking target.
Figure 2 shows the throughput vs. the number of messages.
Figure 2 indicates that the number of messages has a dramatic
effect on the system throughput. Initially, the system throughput
starts to increase with the increment of the number of messages,
but then decreases as the increment of large overhead intro-
duced into the system. The large overhead refers to the payload
BC , the sibling nodes from the leaves to the root. Subsequently,
the system throughput drops to zero. System throughput results
that are lower than zero are omitted in Figure 2. Therefore, the
number of messages, which provides the highest throughput for
given packet size and given authentication probability, should
be selected as the optimal number of messages.
10
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Fig. 2: The effect of the number of messages on system
throughput.
B. Effect of Authentication Probability
on Throughput and Compromising
Probability
Since not all the packets sent by the source are authen-
ticated with the satisfaction of system security requirement,
the values of authentication probability has impacts on the
system throughput and compromising probability. Simulations
concerning system throughput analysis integrated with Selec-
tive Repeat ARQ and Go-Back-N ARQ and compromising
probability are conducted.
Figure 4 shows the simulation results of system throughput
of the commercial network obtained by adopting Selective Re-
peat ARQ and Go-Back-N ARQ vs. authentication probability.
Simulation results indicate that, with the increment of authen-
tication probability, system throughput decreases; at 100% au-
thentication probability, the system throughput degrades to that
obtained in [19]. This shows that system throughput obtained
by applying the proposed game theoretic approach is superior
to the existing approach that applies stringent authentication
protocol. We could also observe that the throughput obtained
by incorporating Selective Repeat ARQ is better than that
obtained by incorporating Go-Back-N ARQ, which is due to
the fact that any error happened in transmission process needs
the retransmission of all packets within the window in the
Go-Back-N ARQ scheme. System compromising probability
is 0 while complete authentication scheme is applied. We set
the system security requirement as 0.20, which means there
are at most 20 packets in every 100 packets sent by the
source tampered by the attacker and could not be used by
the destination to recover the original information sent by the
source. Figure 4 shows that values of system compromising
probability decrease as the authentication probability increases.
Thus, the proposed static game theoretic approach can have
the trade-off between system throughput and system security
6requirement. With an acceptable compromising probability,
we obtain superior system throughput compared with existing
approach [19].
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, a static game theoretic approach for security
and QoS co-design in cooperative wireless ad hoc networks
was proposed to model the interactions between the attacker’s
attacking target selection and the source’s relay selection. Sim-
ulation results were presented to show the effectiveness of the
proposed approach, which provides a quantitative framework
on relay selection and study the trade-off between system
performance and system security requirement. Future work is
in progress to investigate the possibility of applying dynamic
game theory for security and QoS co-design in cooperative
wireless ad hoc networks, which enables the source to dynami-
cally update its relay selection strategies by taking the attacker’s
attacking target selection strategies into consideration.
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